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Abstract: We conduct a field experiment to assess whether risk preferences significantly 
differ across the health and financial domains when they are elicited through the same 
paired-lotteries method. We administrate the Holt and Laury (2002) multiple price list 
(MPL) experimental tests to a sample of 300 patients attending outpatients’ clinics in a 
university hospital in Athens, during the Greek financial crisis. Risk preferences in finance 
are elicited using paired-lotteries tests with hypothetical payments. The experimental tests 
are adapted to the health domain by framing the lotteries as risky treatments in hypothetical 
healthcare scenarios. Using Maximum Likelihood methods, we estimate the degree of risk 
aversion in both the financial and the health domain, allowing for the estimates to vary with 
individual observables. Despite being exposed to both health and financial distress, subjects 
in our sample tend to be less risk averse in the financial than in the health domain. Risk 
attitudes in the two domains are also associated to partly distinct characteristics: while 
married respondents are more risk averse in the wealth domain, subjects with higher 
education tend to be more risk seeking in the health domain. Subjects affected by chronic 
diseases appear more risk averse not only in health but also in financial decisions.  
 
Key words: Behavioural experiments in health; Field experiments; Risk aversion. 
JEL classification: I1, C93, D81. 
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Introduction 
 
We report the results from an ‘artefactual’ field experiment (in the sense of Harrison and 
List, 2004) with 300 patients attending outpatients clinics in a Greek hospital during the 
financial crisis. We elicit their risk preferences within both the financial and the health 
domain using the same paired-lotteries method (Holt and Laury, 2002) with hypothetical 
payments. We estimate the degree of risk aversion, directly look at the similarities and 
differences in risk preferences across the two domains, and explore their links with a range 
of observable characteristics. 
 
The work is motivated by the increasing interest in the stability of preferences among 
‘applied behavioural scientists’ (in the sense of Kahneman, 2012). The traditional economics 
view assumes that individuals have stable preferences over time and across different 
situations, frames, and domains in life (Stigler and Becker, 1977).  
 
In psychology, numerous studies have challenged the view that risk preferences are stable, 
documenting that preferences depend not only on the frame and context (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Hershey and Shoemaker, 1980; Hershey, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker, 
1982; Slovic, 1987; Tversky and Thaler, 1990; Rabin and Thaler, 2001; Kahneman 2003a, 
2003b), but also on a variety of personal feelings, emotions, and ‘visceral’ states 
(Loewenstein, 1996; Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2000).  
 
The literature, moreover, has provided ample evidence documenting intra-individual 
inconsistencies for risk preferences across different life domains (Jackson, Hourany, and 
Vidmar, 1972; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Horvath and Zuckerman, 1993; Weber, 
Blais, and Betz, 2002; Hanoch, Johnson, and Wilke, 2006; Prosser and Wittenberg, 2007; 
Dohmen at al., 2011). Tests such as the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT) 
have been used to explicitly differentiate between risk attitudes in six distinct domains: 
ethical, gambling, health/safety, investing, recreational, and social risk taking (Weber, Blais, 
and Betz, 2002; Blais and Weber, 2006). Similar tests measuring risk preferences in multiple 
life domains are the Risk Propensity Questionnaire (Rohrmann, 2005), and the Risk 
Propensity Scale (Nicholson et al., 2004), among others. Dohmen et al. (2011), for instance, 
considered the SOEP survey in Germany, which asks respondents to self-assess their 
willingness to take generic risks on a 0-10 Likert scale, “in general” and in five different 
domains, including financial and health decisions. Although responses were generally 
consistent with similar profiles of risk aversion, differences emerged across domains, with 
an average risk seeking score of 2.934 (out of 10) in health, compared to 2.406 in financial 
decisions. 
 
Here we explore the possibility of measuring risk preferences across domains using an 
alternative experimental test that involves specific concrete trade-offs, instead of generic 
abstract attitudes.  In particular, we elicit intra-individual risk preferences in the financial 
and health domain using variants of the same paired-lottery test originally proposed by Holt 
and Laury (2002). Together with the Gneezy and Potters (1997) and the Eckel and 
Grossman (2002) tests, the Holt and Laury (2002) method is one of the most widely used 
incentive-compatible tests to measure risk preferences among experimental economists. It is 
essentially a multiple price list (MPL) method where subjects are asked to choose the lottery 
they prefer in a series of pairs of lotteries.  
 
In particular, we consider subjects attending out-patients clinics in a hospital in Greece 
during the current financial crisis. By its very construction, such a pool of subjects finds 
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itself within a ‘naturally occurring’ state of both financial and health distress. This peculiar 
condition makes most likely that the respondents perceive the risky trade-offs as realistic 
and vivid even in absence of actual incentive-compatible consequences for their responses.  
 
Experiments with patients have also been considered by Prosser and Wittenberg (2007), who 
elicited certain equivalents in both health and money lotteries for 56 adult patients diagnosed 
with multiple sclerosis. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to consider a 
relatively large pool of subjects (n=300) in a condition of both financial and health distress, 
and to elicit their risk preferences in both the financial and the health domain using the same 
MPL paired-lotteries experimental methods. Exploring different trade-offs measures for 
cross-domains preferences is timely and potentially promising since there seems to be no 
current ‘gold standard’ to measure risk attitudes with respect to health, and very few 
measures have been tested in healthcare settings (Harrison et al., 2005; Prosser and 
Wittenberg, 2007; van der Pol and Ruggeri, 2008; Young et al., 2008; Butler et al., 2012). 
 
We find that risk preferences differ across the health and the financial domain even when 
they are elicited through an experimental test with the same structure; respondents in our 
sample of Greek patients manifested higher discomfort in considering risky choices in the 
health context. We also identified a number of similarities and differences in what explains 
risk preferences in the two domains.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methods of the study, 
and in particular the design of the experiment, the estimation of risk preferences in the 
financial and the health domain, and the related methodological questions. Section 3 
presents the estimations’ results. Section 4 discusses the findings and section 5 briefly 
concludes. 
 
Methods 
Design and structure of the experiment 
The study took place in the outpatient clinics in the Laiko General Hospital in Athens, 
Greece, where one of the authors (CS) had previous research contacts. Laiko is a University 
Hospital, one of the country’s largest general public hospitals, and, located in the centre of 
Athens, it covers the broader region of Attica. 
 
Data were collected while patients were waiting to see their doctors in the outpatient clinics 
of the hospital, between 9am and 1pm. Patients who agreed to participate were given the 
questionnaire, which took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Patients were given both 
verbal and written instructions. The research assistant was sitting next to them, clarifying 
issues regarding the experimental tests and making sure that respondents clearly understood 
the questions.  
 
The first part of the questionnaire assessed socio-demographic variables (e.g. age, sex, 
education, income brackets), individual life style and health habits (e.g. self-assessed health, 
drinking and smoking behaviour, physical exercise), and psychological traits (e.g. 
overconfidence). In the second part of the experiment we elicited individual risk preferences. 
 
The questionnaire was developed in English and was linguistically validated in Greek 
following the guidelines of Acquardo et al. (2004) and Guillemin, Bombardier et al. (1993) 
on cross-cultural adaptation. It was first tested among 32 individuals in different age and 
education groups (see details in Appendix). The answers from this pilot are not included in 
the final analysis.  
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The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Laiko Hospital on the 6
th
 of 
August 2010 (protocol number ES 462). The fieldwork started in September 2010 and run in 
four waves over a period of fourteen months. Each wave lasted about 5 weeks. The period of 
data collection was of intense economic and political distress for Greece. A series of severe 
austerity measures were taken earlier that year (April 2010) when the country’s deficit 
reached 12% of the GDP. In May 2010 the IMF and the EU agreed on the first bailout loan 
to Greece. During the months of the data collection, the Greek parliament voted a new 
austerity bill, after which a second ‘bailout’ loan was agreed with the IMF and the EU. The 
austerity measures were followed by a series of strikes and violent riots, while lack of 
political unity led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister and the formulation of a 
coalition government (for a brief timeline of the Greek economic crisis see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline).  
 
Eliciting and estimating risk preferences in the financial and the health domain 
We elicited individual risk preferences within the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
framework. In particular, following most experimental economics studies, we assume that 
the risk preferences can be represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function (Holt and Laury, 2002; Andersen et al., 2008a; 2008b; 2010): the utility function of 
a subject in the financial domain, in terms of monetary payoffs W, is thus 
 ( )  
    
 
    
   (1) 
 
Where    is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion in the financial domain. 
Depending on the value of    a subject shows different degrees of risk aversion in the 
financial domain, that can be grouped in three main types: 
1. If       risk neutral 
2. If       risk averse 
3. If       risk seeker 
 
In a similar way, the utility of a subject within the health domain is defined in terms of days 
in full health H, and assumed to be  ( )  
    
 
    
, where    is the coefficient of constant 
relative risk aversion in the health domain. 
 
As mentioned, we used the same MPL method by Holt and Laury (2002) to elicit risk 
preferences in both the finance and the health domains. In particular, we have used the 
standard paired-lotteries method to elicit risk aversion in the financial domain in terms of 
monetary outcomes, and we adapted it in terms of days in full health to estimate risk 
aversion in health. The Appendix reports a detailed description of the methodological 
questions that informed the design of the experimental tests. In particular, it discusses the 
several reasons why we opted for tests with hypothetical payments in both domains.   
 
Briefly, each subject was asked two series of questions, separated by a questionnaire, the 
first one to elicit risk preferences in the finance domain, the second one to elicit risk 
preferences in the health domain. The pilot study suggested that lotteries were easier to 
understand if presented first in the finance domain. Each of the two series of questions asked 
the outpatients in the clinics to choose between two risky situations (lotteries), A and B, each 
having two outcomes, say, 1 and 2. In the 9 pairs of risky situations proposed to subjects in 
either series, we varied both the probabilities pkj and the payoffs associated to each outcome 
k=1,2 of the two lotteries, either in monetary (Wkj) or in health (Hkj) terms, with j=A,B. The 
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probabilities varied from 0 to 100%, while the payoffs varied from €10 to €385 in the 
financial domain, and from 10 to 385 days in full health in the health domain. As discussed 
in greater detail in the Appendix, the correspondence of one day in full health with one Euro 
was not only a natural candidate, but it was also justified by the result of an exploratory 
willingness-to-pay experiment we run in the pilot. In Tables 1 and 2, we provide a 
representation of the set of choices presented to subjects in the financial and the health 
domain, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
To empirically estimate risk preferences we have used Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods 
and followed Andersen et al. (2008b; 2010), and Harrison (2008), where the full details of 
the empirical strategy can be found. Here we briefly explain how subjects’ choices have 
been used to estimate risk preferences, say, in the finance domain.  
 
From (1) U(W) is the utility that a subject perceives from getting a monetary payoff W. 
Under Expected Utility Theory, the expected utility by a subject of a given lottery j=A,B is 
just the utility of each outcome k=1,2 in that lottery, weighted by the probability pk of the 
outcome: 
 
EUj = ∑k=1,2  pkj * U (Wkj)      (2) 
 
with j=A,B and k=1,2. Clearly the expected utility depends on the subject’s risk aversion 
parameter r
w
, the variable that we want to estimate. Based on a candidate value of r
w
 a latent 
preference index Δ(EU) can be constructed. Importantly, our empirical model allows 
subjects in the outpatient clinics to make stochastic errors when comparing expected 
utilities. In particular, following Holt and Laury (2002) we include in our estimation a 
further parameter μ to capture the stochastic error, and we write our latent index as:  
 
 (  )  
(   )
 
 ⁄
(   )
 
 ⁄  (   )
 
 ⁄
                           (3) 
 
Essentially, when μ→0 the stochastic errors become negligible and the empirical 
specification reduces to a deterministic EUT choice, where the subject works out the 
difference between the perceived expected utilities from the two lotteries A and B. The latter 
index in such a case is thus simply the difference Δ(EU) = EUA – EUB,  which depends on 
the subject’s latent risk preferences rw. The subject then always chooses the lottery with 
higher expected utility: lottery A every time the latent index gets positive values, and lottery 
B otherwise. When, however, μ gets larger, μ→±∞, the choice between the two lotteries 
becomes essentially random, with the value of the latent index function approaching ½ for 
any values of the expected utilities. 
 
This latent index can be directly seen as a cumulative probability density function (CDF), as 
it takes values within the range between 0 to 1, and equals ½ when the subject is indifferent 
between the two lotteries (Holt and Laury, 2002). In particular, we assume that the latent 
index Δ(EU) follows a normal CDF, so that Φ(Δ(EU)) can be thought to link the latent 
preferences and the binary choices observed in the experiment: 
 
Prob (choosing lottery A) = Φ(Δ(EU))         (4) 
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Therefore, under the assumptions of Expected Utility Theory and of CRRA utility functions, 
the likelihood of observing a specific choice depends on the individual risk preference r
w
, 
given the normal CDF linking the latent index to the observed choices. Since indifference 
responses were explicitly ruled out, the individual log-likelihood of choosing either lottery 
in each of the observed choices yi, in our experiment is given by:  
 
Ln L (r
w, μ; y) = ∑i ((ln Φ(Δ(EU))| yi =1 ) + ((ln Φ(1 – Δ (EU))| yi =0 )               (5) 
 
where yi =1(0) denotes the choice of lottery A(B) in the proposed pair of lotteries i. The 
above estimation procedure differs from a binary choice model such as a probit, in that it 
structurally estimates the latent index of the individual parameter r
W
 using the values of the 
probabilities and the outcomes as induced by the experimental lotteries, and the actual 
choices by the subjects observed in the experiment.  In particular, we pooled together all the 
observations within each domain in order to estimate r
w
 and r
h
: as, for each risk domain, our 
questionnaire collected 9 responses for 300 subjects, the resulting dataset comprised 2700 
observations for either domain. We corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
observations within the same subject, by treating the residuals from the same subject as 
potentially correlated, and computing cluster-robust standard errors of estimates.  
 
Using Stata 11, we wrote a program to compute the expected utilities by the subjects and the 
latent index Δ(EU) and to construct the above log-likelihood function. The program passed 
into the log-likelihood function the data on the probabilities and monetary payoffs of the 
experimental lotteries and the observations on the preferred choices by the subjects. The log-
likelihood function was then evaluated by Stata ML routine and maximized using the 
Newton-Raphson (NR) optimization technique (for a detailed treatment on maximum 
likelihood estimation using Stata, see Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney, 2006). 
 
The above ML approach is sufficiently flexible to allow the CRRA coefficients r
w
 and r
h
 to 
vary with the individual observed characteristics (Andersen et al., 2008a-b; Harrison, 2008). 
In particular, define X as a vector of m observed characteristics, including socio-
demographic controls, income and health variables, and other behavioural characteristics. 
The ML program can be adjusted to allow the CRRA parameters r
w
 (and r
h
) to be linear 
functions of the m individual characteristics in the vector X such as:  
 
r
w
= α 0 + ∑m γ m Xm                                (6) 
 
If the vector X  of observed characteristics is included, the above log-likelihood function 
becomes:  
 
Ln L (r
w, μ; y, X) = ∑i ((ln Φ(Δ(EU))| yi =1; X ) + ((ln Φ(1 – Δ(EU))| yi =0; X )               (7) 
 
Variables and main descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents a definition and the main descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the analysis, namely standard socio-demographic and economic variables (age, genderf, 
married, children, educ, income, finconstr), self-assessed health (sah), and self-reported 
health conditions and behaviours (chronic, smokerd, alcohol, gym).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
We also controlled for two psychological traits which are often used to measure 
overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2002), namely the better-than-average and the illusion 
7 
 
of control attitudes. The better-than-average is the tendency to believe oneself to have 
superior characteristics to the average person, a potentially correlated, but clearly distinct, 
attitude from risk preferences. Following Bias et al. (2002, 2005) and Taylor and Brown 
(1988) we measure it using a simple test based on questions such as: What percentage of 
people of your age have a better job than you because they have better skills? Scores for 
each question were calculated in the form of a (50- answer)/50 index and then averaged at 
an individual level. The final index (BTA) measures how much a subject felt better-than- (or 
worse-than-) average, ranging from -100 to +100 (feeling the worst and the best, 
respectively). 
 
The second psychological trait was illusion of control, namely the feeling to have control 
over what in fact are largely random situations, a tendency which is intuitively associated 
with risk preferences. Subjects were asked to declare whether and how much they agree, on 
a 1 to 5 scale, with a number of statements, such as: My forecasts are always correct. Scores 
were then computed as (5 – answer )/4 and averaged at an individual level. The final illusion 
of control index (IC) measures how much a subject suffers from illusion of control and takes 
values from 0 to 100.  
 
The last variable is round. As mentioned above, data collection took place in a period during 
which the economic and financial situation in Greece progressively aggravated. To control 
for the possible effect of this situation, we included the variable round ranging from 1 to 4 
indicating the wave in which the questionnaire was collected. 
 
Results 
We first present the coefficients of risk aversion in the wealth and the health domains, r
w
 and 
r
h
, respectively, estimated using model (5). Results are presented in Table 4. As it can be 
seen, patients in our sample tended to be more risk averse in the health than in the finance 
domain.  
 
The ‘structural’ estimation of the behavioural parameters shows that while respondents’ 
choices were significantly risk averse in the health domain, in the financial domain we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects in our sample made choices consistent with 
risk neutral preferences (i.e. r
w
 =0).   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
We next present the coefficients of risk aversion in the wealth (r
w
) and health (r
h
) domain 
estimated using model (7) that allows them to vary with the observable characteristics.  
 
Risk preferences in finance 
Table 5 shows all the specifications for the estimations of individual risk aversion in the 
financial domain. The analysis moves from model 1, which controls only for socioeconomic 
parameters, to model 2, in which we added the health characteristics, then model 3, where a 
number of health habits were included, and, finally, model 4, where the psychological traits 
were also controlled for. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Of all the socio-demographic characteristics, only marital status shows results that are robust 
across all specifications: married people were significantly more risk averse in the financial 
domain than the non-married. Education has in some specifications a, marginally significant, 
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negative effect, but the effect is not robust across all specifications. The variable for gender 
is significant in two specifications, suggesting that no significant gender differences exist in 
risk preferences in the financial domain for our sample of respondents. 
 
When health characteristics are considered, self-assessed health is never significant. 
Interestingly, however, having a chronic health condition is consistently associated to risk 
preferences in finance: patients who had chronic conditions were significantly more risk 
averse in the financial domain.  
 
From the health habits, respondents who reported to drink alcohol gave responses that 
tended to be compatible with higher risk aversion, while exercise and smoking did not show 
any significant association.  
 
Finally, the more the patients suffer from illusion of control the more risk loving they tended 
to be. This finding provides a confirmation that our experimental test for risk preferences 
generally correlates well, and in the expected direction, with a common psychometric 
measure for illusion of control, a behavioural attitude that is intuitively associated with the 
way uncertainty is perceived by individuals.  
 
We next turn to models 5-8 of Table 5, which controls for the round in which the data was 
collected (round). Round was, in fact, in all specifications significant with a negative sign: 
subjects who were interviewed in later waves provided responses which were compatible 
with higher risk seeking in financial decisions than respondents in earlier waves. The effect 
is highly significant and robust across all specifications and robustness checks.  
 
The effect of the gradual deterioration of the economy, however, appeared to have an 
asymmetric effect on the risk attitudes of respondents with different levels of financial 
stress. In particular, the inclusion of the variable round also turn finconstr, indicating how 
comfortable participants felt to cope with their current financial situation, into a significant 
variable in most specifications. Therefore, although the deterioration of the economic and 
political crisis in Greece made respondents generally less risk averse when deciding between 
financial options, it also made respondents already in financial distress, significantly more 
risk averse in financial decisions.  
 
An interesting side finding is that, in the specifications controlling for the interviews’ wave, 
income turns out not to be significant, while finconstr is. A possible interpretation is that, 
while income directly captures subjects’ wealth, the financial constraint variable is more 
related to the subjective emotional state, or the general mood (for instance, anxiety), 
associated to how subject feel about the overall financial situation. The possible analogy 
between subjectively assessed health and objectively measured health outcomes may explain 
only part of the story, though. In fact, subjects may think of the overall financial situation as 
encompassing many other factors rather than simply income. The stability of future income 
flows, for instance, is likely to play a major role, and could have been under a specific threat 
for some subjects in our sample, due to the drastic austerity measures that often entailed 
cutting jobs and salaries. 
 
Although the inclusion of round generally made the association with several variables (e.g. 
education, chronic condition, alcohol consumption) not statistically significant, across all 
models the significant effect of being married persists and is confirmed: married patients 
tended to be more risk averse in the financial context.  
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Risk preferences in health 
For the sake of direct comparability, within the health domain we have replicated exactly the 
same specifications as for the financial domain. Table 6 presents the results in an analogous 
way to Table 5. The first four models are done without controlling for the effect of round 
while models 5-8 do. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The results in the health domain show both similarities and differences with the financial 
domain regarding the individual characteristics associated to risk preferences. Considering 
socio-demographic characteristics only, a quite different picture emerges with respect to the 
financial context. Unlike for financial decisions, education has the most robust effect in the 
health domain: patients with higher levels of education appeared significantly less risk 
averse in health. Since higher levels of education are typically associated with higher levels 
of income, this result is generally consistent with analogous findings that more affluent 
subjects tend to be more risk seeking (Harrison et al., 2008). However, it adds to this the 
specific observation that more affluent individuals also tend to be more risk seeking in 
health matters, as also confirmed by the sign of the income variable, although rarely 
significant. Another difference with respect to the financial domain concerns the marital 
status, whose significance is not robust across specifications.  
 
An analogy with the financial domain emerges when the analysis controls for health status: 
patients with chronic diseases tend to be characterised by risk averse preferences also for 
health matters, while self-assessed health does not turn out to play any significant role in 
health decisions either. 
 
Controlling for health habits leads to both analogies and differences between the financial 
and the health domains. On the one hand, subjects who drink alcohol seem to be 
characterised by responses compatible with more risk averse preferences also in the health 
domain. On the other hand, current smokers and respondents who exercise more tend to 
show more risk loving attitudes in the health domain.  
 
Finally, also within the health domain, our experimental test to measure risk preferences 
seems to correlate well, and in the expected direction, with the measure for illusion of 
control, intuitively associated with risk perception. In particular, as for the financial domain, 
subjects who have higher illusion of control scores, tend also to be more risk seeking. 
Moreover, and differently from what found for the financial domain, the better-than-average 
attitude seems significantly associated with our experimental measure for risk preferences in 
health: subjects with higher better-than-average scores made choices consistent with more 
risk averse preferences within the health context, an interesting finding confirming that, as 
observed above, the two measures can indeed capture quite distinct behavioural traits. 
 
As for the financial domain, we have replicated the analysis including the variable round to 
test any effect of the different times of data collection (models 5-8).  Also in the health 
domain, round was significant in all specifications with a negative sign: subjects who were 
interviewed in later waves provided responses compatible with higher risk seeking in health 
matters than respondents in earlier waves.  
 
Discussion 
Our analysis shows that respondents in our pool were relatively more risk averse in health 
than financial matters. The result is qualitatively in line with the finding by Dohmen et al. 
10 
 
(2011) and is of particular interest given that Prosser and Wittenberg (2007) found that the 
56 patients diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in their sample were essentially risk neutral in 
the health domain, while significantly risk averse in the financial one. Besides obvious 
differences in the two pools of subjects, as well as in the methods to measure risk 
preferences, in principle the differences in cross-domains risk attitudes could be partly due 
to the fact that our respondents were also exposed to financial distress. 
 
In the financial domain, we found that patients with a chronic condition were significant 
more risk averse than those who did not report a chronic problem. This result confirms and 
qualifies the evidence by Prosser and Wittenberg (2007) that patients diagnosed with 
multiple sclerosis were significantly risk averse in financial matters. No gender differences 
were observed, a result which is in line with previous literature (Andersen et al., 2006; 
Harrison et al., 2007; Viscusi et al., 2011). 
 
Drinking alcohol was associated with higher risk aversion in the financial domain but 
neither smoking nor exercise were. This latter finding is broadly consistent with Harrison et 
al. (2010), Dohmen et al. (2011), Galizzi and Miraldo (2012), Szrek et al. (2012), and Sutter 
et al. (2013) who also found not significant association between smoking status and risk 
preferences in financial decisions. What is more, and although smoking does not affect risk 
preferences in the financial domain, smokers in our sample are more risk seeking in the 
health domain. This finding is consistent with Dohmen et al. (2011) who found that the 
smoking status was significantly associated with (self-assessed) willingness to take risks in 
general and in the health domain, but not in financial matters. A possible speculation for the 
effect of exercise, refers to the observation that exercising and doing sports may require a 
pro-active state of mind which can be associated with risk-taking attitude. 
 
A striking finding is the effect round in our analysis. Both in the financial and the health 
domain, respondents were more likely to be risk loving if they were interviewed at a later 
round of the study, when the recession was deeper. In health decisions, the effect of the 
gradual deterioration of the economy, appeared to have an asymmetric effect on the risk 
attitudes of respondents with different levels of financial stress. In particular, the inclusion 
of the variable round again turned finconstr into a significantly positive coefficient. Thus, 
although the aggravation of the crisis in Greece made respondents generally less risk averse 
in health decisions, it also made respondents already in financial distress, significantly more 
risk averse in health. This is in line with the latest evidence about the insurgence of health 
risky behaviours among the most deprived segments of the population (Kentikelenis et al., 
2011; Paraskevis et al., 2013; WHO, 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
The goal of the work was to elicit the risk preferences of a sample of patients in both the 
financial and the health domain using the same MPL paired-lotteries experimental method, 
and to look at the similarities and differences across the two domains, as well as their links 
with observable characteristics. 
 
We find empirical evidence that individual risk preferences may differ between the health 
and the financial domains even when they are measured using the same MPL paired-lotteries 
experimental method. When risk preferences are measured using the same MPL 
experimental test in both finance and health, similarities as well as differences emerge in the 
factors associated with risk preferences across domains.  
 
11 
 
The fact that risk preferences may differ across the health and the finance domains is 
generally in line with the current evidence (Weber et al., 2002; Blais et al., 2006; Prosser 
and Wittenberg, 2007; Dohmen et al. 2011). Our study qualifies and confirms these findings 
by using, across both domains, the same MPL experimental test involving concrete and 
specific trade-offs, instead of domain-specific tests or generic abstract attitudinal questions.  
 
From a methodological perspective, conducting the same experimental MPL test with 
subjects in ‘naturally occurring’ field situations of both financial and health distress can 
contribute to bring closer together two research methods and streams of literature which 
have insofar proceeded along distinct paths: on the one hand, incentive-compatible 
experimental measures for risk preferences with real monetary stakes, and on the other, self-
assessed attitudinal questions in generic, abstract, and detached health situations. The 
attempt to bridge the gap between these two approaches seems most needed at the moment. 
Despite its key importance for both research and policy purposes, in fact, there is no current 
‘gold standard’ to measure risk attitudes with respect to health, nor to compare them across 
different contexts or domains (Harrison et al., 2005; Prosser and Wittenberg, 2007; Young et 
al., 2008; Butler et al., 2012). 
 
From the perspective of bringing closer together the methods used in measuring risk 
preferences, an interesting question is related to whether the ‘disciplinary’ power of 
incentives, inherently associated with incentive-compatible tests, is sufficiently strong to 
realign individual responses on risk attitudes across the two domains. We envisage further 
research to answer this question in more controlled experimental settings. 
 
Yet the results we have reported here suggest that examining how individual risk attitudes 
relate across different domains, and which factor is associated to them, seems a promising 
direction in attempting to understand how people make decisions involving both health and 
finance. Its implications are not only of scientific interest. The development of different 
metrics and methods to measure risk preferences in health and to compare them with their 
monetary analogous can prove useful to enrich the validity of the cost-effectiveness analyses 
and decision-making models in which they can be incorporated.  
 
Understanding risk preferences in the health domain is also very important to allow a better 
exploration of how patients take healthcare decisions, such as adhering to medical decisions 
and seeking a second medical opinion. Evidence in this area is very limited. 
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Table 1: The set of choices between binary lotteries given to the patients in the financial 
domain 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € P € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
 
 
Table 2: The set of choices between binary lotteries given to the patients in the health 
domain. 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your Choice 
 P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
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Table 3: Description of variables 
         
Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Age Age in years 39.62 12.91 18 74 
Genderf Female (0=no, 1=yes) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Educ Level of education 5.59 1.63 1 8 
Income Income level (1= less than €600 …5=more than €2,000) 2.58 1.06 1 5 
Finconstr 
Constrained by my financial state (1=leaving 
comfortably…4=find it very difficult) 2.46 0.75 1 4 
Married Married (0=no, 1=yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Children Having children (0=no, 1=yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Sah Self-assessed health (1= very good…5=very bad) 2.40 1.16 1 5 
Chronicd Chronic condition (0=no, 1=yes) 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Smokerd Smoking daily or occassionally (0=no, 1=yes) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Alcohold 
Drinking at least a unit of alcohol per week (0=no, 
1=yes) 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Gym Number of hours of vigorous exercise per week  2.76 4.38 0 50 
BTA Better than average index 59.44 33.43 -72 100 
IC Illusion of control index 61.29 12.80 18.75 100 
Round Wave in which the questionnaire was collected     1 4 
 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated CRRA degree of risk aversion in the financial and the health domains  
 
 
Finance Health 
Coefficient -0.00579 
(0.0578) 
 
Coefficient 0.131** 
(0.0518) 
 
Noise       116.9*** 
     (33.99) 
 
Noise 55.68*** 
(13.85) 
 
Observations 2700 Observations 2700 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 5: Risk Preferences in the Finance Domain 
     
  model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8 
Age 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0024 0.0018 0.0015 0.0012 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0024) 
Genderf 0.0180 0.0321 0.0540* 0.0585** 0.0234 0.0325 0.0451 0.0460* 
 (0.0296) (0.029) (0.0296) (0.029) (0.0297) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0276) 
Educ -0.0177* -0.0126 -0.0180 -0.0228* -0.0184 -0.0108 -0.0148 -0.0187 
 (0.0108) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0128) 
Income -0.0211 -0.0108 0.0052 0.0060 0.0029 0.0094 0.0162 0.0127 
 (0.0173) (0.017) (0.0192) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0198) (0.0187) 
Finconstr -0.0137 -0.0048 0.0069 0.0142 0.0421 0.0530* 0.0602** 0.0642** 
 (0.0219) (0.0243) (0.0229) (0.0217) (0.0265) (0.0298) (0.0286) (0.0281) 
Married 0.0647* 0.0826** 0.0809** 0.108*** 0.0568* 0.0744** 0.0643* 0.0822** 
  (0.0384) (0.0416) (0.041) (0.0407) (0.0343) (0.0365) (0.0384) (0.0379) 
Children 0.0013 0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0058 -0.0754* -0.0737 -0.0807 -0.0821 
 (0.0435) (0.0475) (0.0505) (0.0501) (0.0431) (0.0477) (0.0507) (0.0502) 
Sah   0.0058 0.0161 0.0200   0.0098 0.0149 0.0171 
   (0.0153) (0.017) (0.0172)   (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Chronicd   0.0928** 0.0914* 0.101*   0.0762 0.0727 0.0852 
   (0.0448) (0.0483) (0.0533)   (0.049) (0.0513) (0.0571) 
Smokerd    -0.0148 -0.0134    -0.0183 -0.0172 
    (0.0322) (0.0337)    (0.0327) (0.0336) 
Alcohold    0.0785** 0.0772**    0.0327 0.0325 
    (0.0354) (0.0345)    (0.0363) (0.0349) 
Gym    -0.0003 -0.0007    -0.0021 -0.0017 
    (0.0023) (0.0016)    (0.0019) (0.0018) 
BTA     0.0002     0.0004 
     (0.0005)     (0.00047) 
IC     -0.0029***     -0.0025** 
     (0.001)     (0.0011) 
Round      -0.0571*** -0.0560*** -0.0556*** -0.0544*** 
      (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0141) 
           
Constant 0.1230 0.0220 -0.0769 0.1080 0.0255 -0.0862 -0.1200 0.0284 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.159) (0.161) (0.165) (0.158) (0.179) 
Noise                 
Constant 96.27*** 99.71*** 101.8*** 101.1*** 106.7*** 106.4*** 111.3*** 111.5*** 
  (29.11) (30.04) (31.01) (29.46) (30.75) (30.19) (33.13) (32.54) 
Observati
ons 
2052 2052 1908 1908 2052 2052 1908 1908 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01       
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Table 6: Risk Preferences in the Health Domain 
 
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8 
Age 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0017 0.00341* 0.00306* 0.0018 0.0019 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.00181) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.00207) 
Genderf -0.0225 -0.0126 0.0105 0.0043 0.0002 -0.0025 0.0118 0.0128 
 (0.0307) (0.031) (0.0316) (0.0302) (0.0286) (0.0275) (0.0289) (0.026) 
Educ -0.026** -0.0294*** -0.0367*** -0.0501*** -0.0211** -0.0204* -0.0277** -0.0385*** 
 (0.0107) (0.011) (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0122) 
Income -0.0307* -0.0249 -0.0004 0.0048 0.0092 0.0108 0.0191 0.0131 
 (0.0174) (0.0179) (0.0198) (0.019) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0175) 
Finconstr -0.0258 -0.0288 -0.0168 -0.0154 0.0582** 0.0558** 0.0561** 0.0605*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0223) (0.022) (0.0207) (0.023) (0.0239) (0.0231) (0.022) 
Married -0.0016 -0.0039 0.0360 0.0760** 0.0280 0.0225 0.0482 0.0663** 
 (0.0358) (0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0359) (0.03) (0.0303) (0.0316) (0.029) 
Children -0.0212 -0.0199 -0.0320 -0.0364 -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0447) (0.0493) (0.0462) (0.0426) (0.0432) (0.0447) (0.0439) 
Sah  -0.0067 -0.0044 -0.0059  0.0062 0.0095 0.0050 
  (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0151)  (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0139) 
Chronic  0.0756* 0.0425 0.0724*  0.0330 0.0056 0.0312 
  (0.0425) (0.0443) (0.0431)  (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0336) 
Smokerd   -0.0538 -0.0533*   -0.0604* -0.0506* 
   (0.0329) (0.0315)   (0.0319) (0.0303) 
Alcohol   0.0897** 0.0924***   0.0479 0.0310 
   (0.0359) (0.0343)   (0.0324) (0.0312) 
Gym   -0.0047*** -0.0038**   -0.0058*** -0.0039** 
   (0.00168) (0.0017)   (0.00161) (0.0016) 
BTA    0.0012***    0.0014*** 
    (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
IC    -0.0033***    -0.0034*** 
    (0.0009)    (0.0009) 
Round     -0.0910*** -0.0907*** -0.0862*** -0.088*** 
     (0.011) (0.0113) (0.012) (0.0116) 
         
Constant 0.382*** 0.402*** 0.296** 0.494*** 0.1260 0.1200 0.1390 0.329** 
 (0.1250) (0.1270) (0.1310) (0.1530) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.153) 
Noise         
Constant 56.90*** 57.55*** 67.50*** 70.91*** 77.79*** 78.14*** 83.59*** 81.99*** 
 (14.53) (14.54) (17.00) (16.91) (18.23) (18.21) (19.37) (18.66) 
Observat
ions 
2052 2052 1908 1908 2052 2052 1908 1908 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01       
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Appendix. Details of experimental tests and methods  
 
As discussed, in the MPL paired-lotteries experiment we opted to not make use of any 
incentive-compatible payment mechanism. While such payment is commonly used in 
experimental economics to truthfully elicit preferences, the nature of our research question 
and design constrains its use. First, the implementation of incentive-compatible outcomes 
related to risky choices in outpatient clinics was, understandably, a major concern for the 
hospital’s Ethics Committee to secure ethical approval to the project.  
  
Second, implementing real payments for the chosen lotteries within the financial domain, 
while making the outcomes within the health domain only hypothetical, would imply the 
introduction of a confounding factor in the design that would hinder the attribution of the 
observed differences in choices to the different domains.  
 
Moreover, from a methodological perspective, as discussed, the use of experimental tests 
involving specific trade-offs, rather than generic and abstract questions allows to “road-test” 
the extension of the MPL method to measure risk preferences in domains other than 
monetary outcomes, and to contribute to bridge the gap between incentive-compatible tests 
for risk preferences with money, on the one hand, and self-reported measures for risk 
attitude in abstract health contexts, on the other. 
 
Finally, opting for hypothetical payments makes our results closely comparable with the 
previous findings by Prosser and Wittenberg (2007) and Dohmen et al.(2011), who also 
looked at risk attitudes in different domains by comparing standard gamble or Likert scale 
responses, respectively. 
 
In order to elicit risk preferences within the health domain, we needed to transform the Holt 
and Laury (2002) financial paired lotteries method into an analogous framework for health 
outcomes. The main objective of this task was to vary the domain in which risk preferences 
were elicited, while keeping unaltered the structure and all other characteristics of the MPL 
elicitation test, thus producing a closely comparable set of experimental data across domains 
(see Tables 1 and 2).  
 
 
In particular, within the health domain, the binary lotteries were presented as pairs of 
different healthcare treatments, both characterized by some risk. The healthcare context was 
chosen to ensure a vivid and realistic representation of the hypothetical alternatives by 
patients attending outpatient clinics, and is fully in line with the choice between two “drugs” 
by Prosser and Wittenberg (2007). Participants, in fact, were told that each treatment in the 
pair of options was expected to provide some amount of health benefits with some 
probability, and a lower amount of health benefits with the complementary probability. In 
analogy to the financial domain, one treatment (A) was presented as characterized by a 
lower variance, in terms of smaller difference between health benefits, than the risky 
treatment (lottery B). The series of proposed pairs of healthcare treatments only differ with 
respect to the probabilities of occurrence for the higher health benefits. Thus, for low 
probabilities, treatment A typically had the higher expected health benefit, while treatment B 
gave the higher expected health benefits for high probabilities. 
 
Concerning the exact nature of health benefits, the natural candidate for the equivalent of an 
extra unit of money in the health domain was an extra unit of time in full health. This is fully 
consistent with the conceptual framework of economic evaluation of healthcare: in cost-
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utility analysis (CUA), in fact, health benefits are typically evaluated relatively to the 
benchmark of a unit of time in “full health”, whose benefit in terms of utility is usually 
standardized to one. In the monetary domain, this closely corresponds to standardizing to 
one the utility of one unit of income/money, as usually assumed in microeconomics. The 
choice of time in full health as the natural equivalent of money in the health domain is also 
in line with Prosser and Wittenberg (2007), who framed the health benefits for their specific 
pool of patients diagnosed with multiple sclerosis as “relapse-free” days. 
 
Importantly, by considering patients in hospital clinics, who were by definition not yet 
“satiated” in their level of time in full health, we ensured that a lottery in the health domain 
providing an extra unit of time in full health was perceived as associated to a strictly positive 
benefit by all subjects. To emphasize this, in the experimental test we also made clear that, 
once the effects of the health treatments was gone in the health scenario, subjects were 
intended to go back to the health status they were currently experiencing. This is also in 
close analogy to the test by Prosser and Wittenberg (2007). 
 
On the other hand, a direct comparability of the “non satiation” state between the two 
domains was secured, by design, through considering a sample of respondents in the middle 
of an economic and financial crisis. Although risky outcomes were only hypothetical in the 
monetary domain too, the actual involvement in a “natural” situation of general financial 
distress ensured that the perceived benefit associated to the idea of receiving a hypothetical 
extra unit of money was positive for each subject. Our peculiar pool of Greek patients, 
“naturally” experiencing, to some extent, both health and financial distress, was thus the best 
imaginable shot at accessing a sample of subjects in the field who were unlikely to feel 
satiated in both money and time in full health. This aspect of our experiment thus maximised 
the likelihood of inducing subjects to mentally represent the risky situations depicted in the 
tests in concrete and tangible terms, and to exert a credible level of cognitive effort in their 
responses, even in presence of hypothetical outcomes. 
 
The conversion rate between one unit of money and of time in full health was another key 
consideration in our methodological discussion. Our main objective was to choose lengths of 
time in full health that were conspicuous and realistic for some hypothetical healthcare 
treatments. A natural and intuitive choice was to use days in full health as unitary interval in 
the health domain. The implicit conversion rate between the financial and the health domain 
of one euro per day in full health was based on several considerations.  
 
First, the objective of the experimental design was to present to subjects a series of risky 
situations that were intuitively perceived as analogous in all other aspects but their domain. 
From this perspective the correspondence of one euro to one day seemed the most natural 
option. Moreover, and importantly, what really matters when comparing the outcomes 
across the financial and the health domains, is not their values per se, but their marginal 
impact on the subjects’ current state in each domain. From this perspective, the two risky 
situations are hypothetically adding on the top of a subject’s income and days in full health, 
one euro and one day in full health, respectively. For an average subject in our sample the 
magnitude of the effects across domains seems reasonably comparable. It should, in fact, be 
kept in mind that the patients in our pool were approached while attending outpatient clinics: 
therefore, although not being in full health, they were clearly not affected by serious 
conditions that could severely impair their daily life, or radically reduce their expectations 
about the future availability of days in full health. 
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Second, one could argue that the exact unit of measure chosen in each domain is of little 
practical relevance within our analytical framework, given that we have opted for CRRA 
utility functions for both the wealth and the health domains. The degree of risk aversion in 
the CRRA specification, in fact, is, by definition, invariant to the absolute scale of the values 
in the selected lotteries in finance (e.g. in euro, pounds, or dollars), or in health (e.g. days, 
weeks, or months).  
 
Third, and crucially, the implicit rate of conversion was based on the evidence from a pilot 
experiment run with a sample of patients from the same hospital having similar 
characteristics to the respondents in our experiment. As discussed, prior to finalizing the 
design of the main fieldwork, we conducted a pilot experiment involving 32 subjects 
attending a sub-set of outpatient clinics at the Laiko Hospital. In addition to checking the 
comprehension and general validity of the questionnaire, the aim of the pilot was also to 
gather information about the description of their current health states by the respondents, 
using the Euroqol EQ-5D classification, and to obtain estimate of the approximate “rate of 
substitution” between money and days in full health by patients. 
 
In the pilot, subjects were first asked to self-assess their own health on the usual 1-5 scale 
and to describe their current health states using the EQ-5D system, rating 5 distinct health-
related dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, anxiety/depression) 
using 3-values scales (no, moderate, or severe problems).  
 
The EQ-5D has been extensively used in health economics as it allows to summarise each 
health state using a 5-digits index, e.g. 11121 for a person who does not have any problem 
(level 1) except a moderate pain or discomfort in the fourth dimension (level 2). It also 
allows attaching quality-of-life “tariffs” to each of the 243 possible scenarios as estimated 
from preferences over health states from representative samples of the general population 
(Kind and Dolan 1995).  
 
Approximately half of the subjects in the pilot experiment were then given a questionnaire 
containing the experimental questions to elicit risk preferences in the finance domain first, 
followed by the questionnaire, and the tests for risk preferences in the health domain, while 
the order was reversed for the other half of the respondents. This manipulation allowed us to 
gather informal insights on the general comprehension of the paired-lotteries tests: when 
interacting with the research assistants, participants seemed to better understand the 
structure of the choice between healthcare treatments when they had previously answered 
analogous MPL tests with money. The final choice of presenting to all subjects the risky 
lotteries in finance before the ones in health was informed by this feedback from the pilot, as 
well as by the analogous design by Prosser and Wittenberg (2007). 
 
Finally, subjects took part into a final questionnaire designed to elicit their “willingness-to-
pay” for one day in full health. The test reproduced the ones proposed by Gyrd-Hansen 
(2003) and, in particular, the design by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (2009).  
 
The results from the pilot experiment proved useful to gather insights to finalise the design 
of the main experiment. First, as expected for outpatients, most subjects described 
themselves as affected by health conditions characterized by only moderate pain or 
discomfort, anxiety or distress, in health states corresponding to the “very mild” ones (e.g. 
21111, 12111, 11211, 11121, 11112) or the “relatively mild” ones (e.g. 12211, 12121, 
11122, 22121, 22112, 21222, 11311).  
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The quality-of-life tariffs estimated from the Time Trade-Off (TTO) method associated to 
these health states vary in the range between 0.556 (state 11311) and 0.883 (state 11211), 
with 1 being, by definition, the value attached to full health and 0 to death. We computed an 
average quality-of-life tariff for patients in our pilot as the average of the tariffs in each EQ-
5D state weighted by the relative number of respondents (out of the 32 interviewed) who 
describe themselves as affected by that state, which returned a value of 0.751. 
 
In addition, the answers to the test designed by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (2009) to 
elicit the WTP for 4 months in full health indicated that virtually all subjects’ maximum 
WTPs were included in the range between €25 and €50 a month, corresponding to a 
maximum expense of about €300-600 a year. The average WTP for the medicine B in the 
pilot sample was €42.4 a month, corresponding to an expenditure of €509 a year, roughly 
the amount of the basic monthly wage in Greece. As this maximum amount was traded by 
subjects in our pilot in exchange of 4 hypothetical months in full health, the monetary value 
attached to one day in full health was about €4.24. This figure seems in line with the 
evidence from Spain by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (2009) who experimentally elicited 
and estimated the mean WTP to avoid 3 days in a health status characterized by a moderate 
pain or discomfort (state 11121 in EQ-5D) in €12.5. Incidentally, it should be noticed, 
however, that both figures are less directly comparable with alternative estimates for other 
countries using different methods: the estimated monetary value for one quality-adjusted-
life-year (QALY) typically span within a range between DKK88,000 (about €12,000) in 
Denmark  ((54) eliciting WTP for a QALY) and US$24,777 (about €18,000) in the US ((56) 
using the human capital estimate method). These alternative estimates implicitly attach to 
one day in full health a monetary value ranging from about €33 to about €50. 
 
The monetary value of about €4.24 attached to one day in full health thus served as 
reference figure to estimate the additional amount of money that gives a marginal utility to 
subjects in our sample equal to the marginal utility of receiving one additional day in full 
health, so to keep the “marginal rate of substitution” between the lotteries in the finance and 
health domain as close as possible to 1. In fact, the marginal utility attached by patients to 
the idea of receiving a hypothetical extra day in full health is the marginal benefit of moving 
from their actual health state to a state of full health for one day. If, consistently with the 
Cost Utility Analysis approach and the construction of the quality-adjusted-life-year 
(QALY) measure, the utility per day is measured in terms of quality-of-life, the marginal 
utility of an additional day in full health is the difference between the quality-of-life tariff in 
full health and the one for the current health state, that is 1-0.751=0.249. Therefore, the 
monetary value associated to such a marginal utility can be estimated at about 0.249*(€4.24) 
= €1.06, suggesting that an additional euro added to the individual “mental account” in the 
finance domain had approximately the same marginal utility of a hypothetical additional day 
in full health in the health domain. This finding provided a further argument supporting our 
choice to use payments in euro for the monetary lotteries corresponding to the number of 
days in full health in the health lotteries. 
 
Finally, while the implicit marginal rate of substitution between money and one day in full 
health is based on the estimated average WTPs of subjects in the pilot experiment, the 
analysis allows to control for individual heterogeneity of the respondents to the main field 
experiment, since we have included direct questions assessing the baseline individual levels 
of the health status, as well as of the income and financial conditions. 
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